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AN EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO EVOKE 
 
Stacey L. Dogan* 
 
Abstract: Ten years ago, in White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a robot violated 
Vanna White’s publicity rights. Since White, the tendency to equate 
evocation with infringement in trademark and right of publicity cases 
has only grown. In contrast to this expansionist trend in trademark and 
right of publicity law, however, courts in recent copyright cases have 
arguably backed away from a strong right to evoke. This Article 
identiªes these trends and suggests some reasons for concern over an 
exclusive right to evoke. The author argues that if we wish to preserve a 
rich commons and avoid signiªcantly chilling free expression, courts 
should at least cabin the right to evoke and ensure that, when utilized, it 
serves the law’s normative goals.1 
 
Introduction 
evoke \i-’vOk\ . . . 1: to call forth or up: as . . . c: to bring to mind or 
recollection ....... 2 
Ten years have passed since the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, in White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,3 held that a 
robot violated Vanna White’s publicity rights.4 In White, the court held 
 
 
* Associate Professor, Northeastern University School of Law. This Article was pre- 
sented at the Boston College Law School Symposium on Intellectual Property, E- 
Commerce and the Internet in October 2002. I appreciate helpful comments from the 
participants, particularly Fred Yen, Joe Liu, Ruth Okediji, and Tony Reese. 
1 As this Article was going to press, the United States Supreme Court decided Moseley v. 
V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003), rejecting a strong-form right to evoke under 
trademark law. See infra notes 135–150 and accompanying text. 
2 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 402 (10th ed. 1996). 
3 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). 
4 See id. at 1399. The court was actually reversing a grant of summary judgment for the 
defense, but it made its views of the merits clear. See id. Ultimately, a jury awarded White 
$403,000 in damages. See Vanna White Wins Suit, Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1994, at B2; see also 
Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., Nos. 93-56318, 93-56510, 1995 WL 115571, at *1–2 (9th Cir. Mar. 
16, 1995) (similarities between physical characteristics of robots and actors precluded 
summary judgment for defendants in right of publicity claim). 
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that the right of publicity extends beyond a celebrity’s name or like- 
ness to cover virtually any symbol that might “evoke” a celebrity’s 
identity for commercial gain.5 Judge Kozinski argued in his dissent 
from a denial of rehearing en banc, “Instead of having an exclusive 
right in her name, likeness, signature or voice, every famous person 
now has an exclusive right to anything that reminds the viewer of her. After 
all, that’s all Samsung did: It used an inanimate object to remind 
people of White, to ‘evoke [her identity].’”6 
Kozinski portrayed this so-called “right to evoke” as a radical de- 
parture from prior precedent,7 but in fact, intellectual property laws 
had been used for some time to prevent the use of non-proprietary 
symbols to evoke personal identities, trademarks, or creative works. 
The right of publicity law was applied to look-alikes,8 sound-alikes,9 
and a racecar that made people think of its driver;10 state trademark 
 
 
5 See White, 971 F.2d at 1399 (A broad right of publicity is necessary because “[t]he 
identities of the most popular celebrities are not only the most attractive for advertisers, 
but also the easiest to evoke without resorting to obvious means such as name, likeness, or 
voice.”). 
6 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1515 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) (denial of rehearing en banc). 
7 See id. Kozinski had plenty of company in criticizing the outcome in White. See Arlen 
W. Langvardt, The Troubling Implications of a Right of Publicity “Wheel” Spun Out of Control, 45 
U. Kan. L. Rev. 329, 399 (1997) (contending that the Ninth Circuit decision created “a 
property right of unprecedented and unwarranted scope”); David S. Welkowitz, Catching 
Smoke, Nailing JELL-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case and the Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3 J. 
Intell. Prop. L. 67, 77–84 (1995); Linda J. Stack, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics 
America, Inc.’s Expansion of the Right of Publicity: Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of Free 
Speech, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1189, 1194–97 (1995); Fred M. Weiler, Note, The Right of Publicity 
Gone Wrong: A Case for Privileged Appropriation of Identity, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 223, 
258 (1994) (“in ªnding misappropriation under these circumstances, a court is empower- 
ing White to enjoin an advertiser from depicting anything next to the ‘Wheel of Fortune’ 
game board”). 
8 See Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
9 See Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, 58 A.D.2d 620, 622 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). 
10 See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(racecar driver has publicity claim against advertiser that used photo of car with uni- 
dentiªable man inside); see also Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831, 836 
(6th Cir. 1983) (“Here’s Johnny” mark found to violate Johnny Carson’s right of publicity); 
Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 624. 
[T]he question before the court is not whether some, or even most, people 
will be reminded of plaintiff when they see this advertisement. In order to ªnd 
that the photograph contains plaintiff’s ’portrait or picture,’ the court would 
have to conclude that most persons who could identify an actual photograph 
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dilution laws had been invoked against marks that resembled other 
marks without causing confusion;11 and copyright law had been inter- 
preted to protect the “total concept and feel” of creative works.12 Cer- 
tainly, trademark and copyright law sometimes offered safe harbor if 
the evocation was designed to parody or criticize the intellectual 
property;13 but if the evocation was not so designed, courts frequently 
granted relief based on a party’s use of material that did not consist 
of, but somehow evoked, another’s original work, trademark, or ce- 
lebrity image.14 
After White, the tendency to equate evocation with infringement 
in trademark and right of publicity cases only grew. After the passage 
of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (“FTDA”), some courts 
concluded that an owner of a famous mark could prevent others from 
using marks that merely “conjure[d]” the famous mark,15 and actors 
extended the right of publicity to devices that evoked characters that 
 
 
 
of plaintiff would be likely to think that this was actually his picture. This 
standard is necessary since we deal not with the question of whether an un- 
disputed picture of plaintiff is recognizable to some, but whether an undis- 
puted picture of defendant Boroff should be regarded, as a matter of law, to 
be a portrait or picture of plaintiff. 
Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 624; see also Lombardo, 58 A.D.2d at 622 (Guy Lombardo sued claim- 
ing that singing of Auld Lang Syne appropriated his identity. The court upheld on the 
basis that people could be deceived into thinking he was in the commercial, even though 
the actor in the commercial did not resemble Lombardo.); Paul J. Heald, Filling Two Gaps 
in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition: Mixed-Use Trademarks and the Problem with 
Vanna, 47 S.C. L. Rev. 783, 806 (1996) (contending that “Judge Kozinski’s dissent fails to 
garner a majority of the Ninth Circuit judges because his assertion that a reference is not 
an appropriation seems equally applicable to generally accepted precedent”). 
11 See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1208 (E.D.N.Y. 
1983) (allowing dilution claim against user of Kids “R” Us mark based on similarity to Toys 
“R” Us sufªx). 
12 See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 
1167 (9th Cir. 1977); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109–10 (9th 
Cir. 1970). 
13 See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986) (copyright); Eveready Battery 
Co., Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440, 450 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (trademark parody). 
14 See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 218 (2d Cir. 1999); Wendt v. Host 
Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1997). 
15 See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Mosley, 259 F.3d 464, 471 n.3 (6th Cir. 2001) (reject- 
ing suggestion that marks must be “substantially similar” for dilution to occur, and requir- 
ing only that junior mark conjure senior mark), rev’d, 123 S. Ct. 1115; Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 
218 (“The marks must be of sufªcient similarity so that, in the mind of the consumer, the 
junior mark will conjure an association with the senior.” (emphasis added)). 
294 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 44:291 
 
 
the actors played on television.16 Courts reached these decisions with 
little consideration of their impact on the cultural commons—i.e., on 
the pool of communicative resources available for use by the public.17 
In contrast to this expansionist trend in trademark and right of 
publicity law, however, courts in recent copyright cases have arguably 
backed away from a strong right to evoke. For example, the “look and 
feel” doctrine, which initially threatened to fence off highly abstract 
features of copyrighted works, has matured into a fairly narrow theory 
of limited applicability.18 Just as signiªcantly, courts in copyright cases 
have repeatedly invoked a series of limiting doctrines designed to pre- 
serve a rich public domain. The idea/expression dichotomy,19 the 
scenes-a-faire doctrine,20 and the merger rule21 all enable courts to 
carve out dimensions of creative works that should not be owned. Fair 
use allows the copying of protected material if necessary to achieve a 
laudable goal.22 By applying a robust version of these doctrines in 
 
 
16 See Wendt, 125 F.3d at 810 (The validity of statutory right of publicity claims is de- 
termined by “[t]he degree to which these robots resemble, caricature, or bear an impression- 
istic resemblance to” plaintiffs.). 
17 See id. at 811 (The court refused to balance actors’ publicity rights against the inter- 
est of the copyright holder in a television program: “While it is true that appellants’ fame 
arose in large part through their participation in Cheers, an actor or actress does not lose 
the right to control the commercial exploitation of his or her likeness by portraying a ªc- 
tional character.”); White, 971 F.2d at 1398 (limiting inquiry in right of publicity cases to 
whether defendant “appropriated” plaintiff’s identity by any means, including by evoca- 
tion). 
18 See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(establishing narrow scope of protection for cases relying exclusively on similarity in over- 
all concept and feel); cf. Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822–25 (9th Cir. 
2001) (holding that to bring a case to the fact-ªnder based on similarities in a work’s “total 
concept and feel,” a plaintiff must ªrst establish substantial similarity in protected aspects of 
work under the Ninth Circuit’s so-called “extrinsic” test). 
19 See Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 587–89 (2d Cir. 1996) (ªnding no infringe- 
ment when the primary similarity between works lay in the same “idea” of a story set in a 
dinosaur theme park). 
20 See id. (The court found no substantial similarity between the settings of two works 
about dinosaur theme parks: although the two works “share a setting of a dinosaur zoo or 
adventure park, with electriªed fences, automated tours, dinosaur nurseries, and uni- 
formed workers, these settings are classic scenes a faire that ºow from the uncopyrightable 
concept of a dinosaur zoo.”). 
21 See Yankee Candle Co., Inc. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 36 (1st Cir. 
2001) (applying merger doctrine to ªnd no infringement unless candle labels are “nearly 
identical” with one another). 
22 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
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look-and-feel cases, most courts have resisted a strong right to evoke 
in copyright law. 
The absence of such muscular limits in trademark and right of 
publicity law has fostered the growth of a right to evoke, to the clear 
detriment of the public. As intellectual property laws extend beyond 
the protection of particular, identiªable elements and into the more 
metaphysical realm, they threaten to overprotect in ways that stiºe 
speech.23 In addition, as parties succeed in enjoining behavior based 
on the use of non-proprietary signals that make people think of them, 
they risk chilling not only those who wish to appropriate their work or 
to trade on their reputation, but also those whose evocation is purely 
referential or even unknowing.24 An exclusive right to evoke therefore 
should concern us. 
This Article seeks to call attention to the right to evoke and to 
identify the costs associated with its expansion. “Right to evoke,” as 
used in this Article, means a right to prevent others from calling to 
mind a particular piece of intellectual property even if they have not 
replicated the intellectual property or deceived the public in any way. 
The critique therefore targets evocation as a right in and of itself, and 
not as a piece of evidence to be considered in an infringement suit. 
Thus, one work’s evocation of another is certainly relevant to proof of 
substantial similarity in a copyright case,25 but it does not alone estab- 
lish that a defendant has wrongfully appropriated copyrighted expres- 
sion.26 Likewise, to dilute a famous mark, a trademark should come 
closer than merely calling the mark to mind,27 and evocation of a per- 
 
 
 
 
 
23 See generally Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy 
and Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept and Feel,” 38 Emory L.J. 393, 426–27 (1989) (discuss- 
ing risk of chill from look-and-feel doctrine). 
24 See White, 989 F.2d at 1513. 
25 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (articulating two-step test for 
infringement, requiring proof of copying and substantial similarity). 
26 See id. at 472–73 (discussing requirement to prove “illicit” or “improper” copying of 
copyrighted expression in infringement suit); see also Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 
720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Stirring one’s memory of a copyrighted character is not 
the same as appearing to be substantially similar to that character, and only the latter is 
infringement.”). 
27 See V Secret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 471 n.3, rev’d, 123 S. Ct. 1115. 
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son’s identity should be a necessary, but not sufªcient, prerequisite to 
a right of publicity claim.28 
To be sure, courts have recognized the public’s afªrmative right 
to evoke trademarks or personal identities in certain circumstances. 
So, for example, individuals may not only evoke, but also use trade- 
marks for parody29 or criticism;30 parties may employ others’ trade- 
marks for comparative advertising or other “fair” uses;31 and reporters 
may evoke individuals’ identities for news reporting without violating 
their right of publicity.32 Each of these cases, however, involves defen- 
dants who, for one reason or another, warrant special license to en- 
gage in behavior that would otherwise infringe. My point here is that 
by allowing evocation to serve as a proxy for infringement of trade- 
 
 
 
28 See Carson, 698 F.2d at 835 (“The right of publicity, as we have stated, is that a celeb- 
rity has a protected pecuniary interest in the commercial exploitation of his identity.”). 
29 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 907 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
No. 02-633, 2003 WL 167680 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2003) (parody of a trademark falls within non- 
commercial use exemption); Lucasªlm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 
897, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“[p]arody is a form of non-commercial, protected speech which 
is not affected by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act”). Some, but not all, jurisdictions 
have held that the First Amendment requires some protection for parody in right of pub- 
licity cases as well. Compare Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 
959, 973–76 (10th Cir. 1996) (parody trading cards protected under First Amendment 
against players’ right of publicity claim), and Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 
21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002) (“[W]hen an artist is faced 
with a right of publicity challenge to his or her work, he or she may raise as afªrmative 
defense that the work is protected by the First Amendment inasmuch as it contains 
signiªcant transformative elements or that the value of the work does not derive primarily 
from the celebrity’s fame.”), with White, 971 F.2d at 1401 (no parody defense to right of 
publicity claim when the “ad’s spoof of Vanna White and Wheel of Fortune is subservient 
and only tangentially related to the ad’s primary message: ‘buy Samsung VCRs’”). 
30 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (c) (2000) (unfair competition and dilution claims both re- 
quire “commercial” use of trademark); see also CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 
462 (4th Cir. 2000) (undue expansion of trademark laws to control language would “di- 
minish our ability to discuss the products or criticize the conduct of companies that may 
be of widespread public concern and importance”) (citing Mark A. Lemley, The Modern 
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687, 1710–11 (1999)). 
31 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307–08 (9th Cir. 
1992) (establishing “nominative fair use” defense in trademark law); SSP Agric. Equip., 
Inc. v. Orchard-Rite Ltd., 592 F.2d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1979) (“use of competitor’s trade- 
mark for purposes of comparative advertising is not trademark infringement ‘so long as it 
does not contain misrepresentations or create a reasonable likelihood that purchasers will 
be confused . . . .’”). 
32 See Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 790, 794 (1995); 
Stephano v. News Group Pubs., Inc., 485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 225–26 (1984). 
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mark and publicity rights, courts risk unduly broadening the kinds of 
behavior that one needs a license to commit. 
Judging from a recent decision of the United States Supreme 
Court, the tide of trademark law may well be turning away from a 
strong-form right to evoke. As this Article was going to press, the 
Court, in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., announced that “the mere 
fact that consumers mentally associate [a] junior user’s mark with a 
famous mark is not sufªcient to establish actionable dilution.”33 If 
lower courts follow the Supreme Court’s cue in Moseley, trademark law 
may follow copyright in limiting the legal consequences of evocation. 
Because Moseley rested on an interpretation of the FTDA, however, it 
reserved no afªrmative evocation right to the public, and has no im- 
pact on state dilution law or the right of publicity.34 
Part I describes the evolution of the right to evoke in copyright, 
right of publicity, and trademark law.35 It begins with copyright, in 
which courts initially ºirted with a right to evoke, but later backed off 
by applying a series of doctrines designed to make copyright true to 
its normative goals.36 After describing this progression, Part I turns to 
right of publicity and trademark, in which a right to evoke has been 
alive and growing.37 Part II outlines the dangers of a right to evoke— 
including its overbreadth and the risk that it will chill legitimate be- 
havior—and contends that the public has an afªrmative interest in 
evoking cultural reference points in our society.38 Part III suggests a 
number of vehicles through which courts might accommodate these 
interests in trademark and right of publicity cases.39 
Two caveats are in order here. First, this Article is preliminary 
and exploratory. I do not pretend to catalog every case recognizing a 
right to evoke, nor do I discuss all of the threats presented by such 
recognition. My goals are more modest—to raise consciousness of the 
existence of a trend and to warn of its dangers. Second, despite my 
concerns about a right to evoke, my opposition is not absolute; I can 
 
 
33 123 S. Ct. at 1124. 
34 See id. 
35 See infra notes 40–150 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 48–78 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 79–150 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 151–165 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 165–171 and accompanying text. 
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imagine circumstances in which an evocation might offend the inter- 
ests that our intellectual property laws are designed to promote. Such 
cases, however, will be rare, and courts must do a better job of guard- 
ing against the other, far more common, cases in which the public 
interest in evocation outweighs the interests of intellectual property 
holders in the protected aspects of their “property.” 
 
I. Evocation as Right 
“Right to evoke” is not a term used by courts in intellectual prop- 
erty cases. Instead, courts describe copyright infringement in terms of 
the rights granted by section 106 of the Copyright Act,40 depict 
trademark entitlements as non-exclusive rights to prevent confusion 
and/or dilution of protected marks,41 and say that the state-law right 
of publicity applies only if a defendant has appropriated an individ- 
ual’s identity for commercial gain.42 
Yet as intellectual property doctrine has evolved, courts have in- 
creasingly loosened the strictures of what it means to copy, to confuse, 
and to appropriate.43 I am not the ªrst to observe this phenomenon; 
countless scholars have traced the expansionist trends of copyright,44 
trademark,45 and right of publicity46 doctrine. This Part critiques a 
 
 
40 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
41 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a), (c) (2000). 
42 See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 967–68 
(10th Cir. 1996). The speciªc elements of a right of publicity claim vary among jurisdic- 
tions, but most jurisdictions that recognize the right have adopted this standard. See id. 
“Most formulations of the right protect against the unauthorized use of certain features of 
a person’s identity—such as name, likeness, or voice—for commercial purposes.” Id. (cit- 
ing J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy §§ 4.9–.15 (1996)). 
43 In many cases, the legislature has either led the way or has codiªed the expansion 
retroactively. The federal dilution right arose as a creature of statutory law. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c). Also, in the 1976 overhaul of the Copyright Act, Congress for the ªrst time gave 
copyright holders a statutory exclusive right to make derivative works based on their copy- 
righted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). 
44 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 
Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2001); Yen, supra note 23, at 393. 
45 Seminal examples include Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks 
as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397 (1990); Lemley, supra note 
30; and Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L.J. 367 (1999). 
46 E.g., Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity 
Rights, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 125, 178–238 (1993) (critiquing each of the theoretical justiªcations 
offered for right of publicity law). 
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particular piece of that expansion: the use of evocation as a proxy for 
proof of violation of a right under copyright, right of publicity, or 
trademark law.47 
 
A. Copyright 
Historically, copyright law did not support claims based on mere 
evocation.48 The standard for infringement—which required both 
copying and substantial similarity—seemed to contemplate claims 
only against parties that replicated identiªable, tangible, and protect- 
able features of copyrighted works.49 Although the law protected 
against the copying of non-literal expression (such as characters and 
plot structures),50 plaintiffs were required to identify with precision 
the high-level expression that the defendant appropriated.51 A plain- 
tiff claiming substantial similarity in plot structure, for example, had 
to  convince  a  fact-ªnder  that  the  defendant’s  plot  replicated  the 
original components of the plaintiff’s own narrative ºow.52      
Beginning in the late 1970s, however, a series of cases began 
eroding the traditional requirement of a particularized showing of 
similarities between works. In the ªrst such case, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Produc- 
tions, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.,53 held that a plaintiff could prove in- 
fringement based solely on similarities in the “total concept and feel” 
of two works, even if the expressive details were quite different. Krofft 
itself involved a claim of infringement of the look and feel of a chil- 
 
 
 
47 See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 45, at 372 (describing “‘property mania’—the belief that 
expanded trademark protection was necessarily desirable so long as the result could be 
characterized as ‘property’”). 
48 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468–69 (2d Cir. 1946). 
49 See id. 
50 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (“It is of 
course essential to any protection of literary property, whether at common-law or under 
the statute, that the right cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would es- 
cape by immaterial variations.”). 
51 See id. at 122–23. In Nichols, for example, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant 
had appropriated the characters and plot structure of her play. See id. at 120. Judge Hand 
found no infringement, however, because the similarities lay in stock characters and the 
highly general “ideas” underlying the play. See id. at 122–23. 
52 See id. 
53 See generally 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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dren’s television show.54 The two-step test that the court adopted55 
virtually invited fact-ªnders to ªnd infringement based on evocation.56 
A decade later, the Ninth Circuit, in Roth Greeting Cards v. United 
Card Co.,57 re-endorsed “total concept and feel” protection in a case 
involving the “mood” of a series of greeting cards.58 The defendant in 
the case had used its own artwork on its cards, and had copied text 
too inconsequential to merit copyright protection.59 All of the particu- 
larized expression in the two lines of cards was thus either unpro- 
tected or not copied.60 The court nonetheless found infringement 
because “the characters depicted in the art work, the mood they por- 
trayed, the combination of art work conveying a particular mood with 
a particular message, and the arrangement of the words on the greet- 
ing card are substantially the same . . . .”61 
Like Krofft, Roth essentially recognized an exclusive right to evoke 
in copyright law.62 Under the “total concept and feel” doctrine as 
originally conceived, a party could prevail in a copyright case without 
identifying any protected similarities between a copyrighted and an in- 
fringing work; a plaintiff only needed to convince a fact-ªnder that 
the works exuded a similar mood.63 
 
 
 
 
54 Id. at 1167. 
55 See id. In the ªrst, “extrinsic” step, the court required a plaintiff to prove similarities 
in the ideas of the two works; in the second, “intrinsic” step, the court asked whether the 
target audience would view the overall feel of the works as substantially similar. See id.; see 
also Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987). But see 
Yen, supra note 23, at 410–11 (Yen criticizes Roth and Krofft for allowing abstract similarities 
between two works to support claim of copyright infringement: “Roth and Krofft strongly 
suggest that the very mood a work creates constitutes its protectable expression. If copy- 
right claims can in fact be maintained at such a high level of abstraction, practically any 
similarity could conceivably support a ªnding of infringement.”). 
56 This was especially true in Krofft, because the court made clear that the fact-ªnder 
should attempt to anticipate the reaction of the target audience—young children. See 562 
F.2d at 1166. 
57 429 F.2d at 1106. 
58 See id. at 1110. 
59 See id. at 1109–10. 
60 See id. 
61 Id. at 1110. 
62 See Roth, 429 F.2d at 1110. 
63 See id. 
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To some extent, this exclusive right to evoke in copyright law 
arose because of the difªculty in articulating exactly what copyright 
law protected, and why. The United States Supreme Court has stated 
repeatedly that copyright in the United States exists for utilitarian 
purposes—”to  stimulate  artistic  creativity  for  the  general  public 
good.”64 Thus, copyright extends only to “intellectual conceptions of 
the author,”65 and protects only against the copying of the author’s 
contributions.66 Yet deciding what kinds of original contributions 
merit protection had long ºummoxed the courts.67 Learned Hand’s 
classic formulation of copyright’s scope—that it extends to expres- 
sion, but not ideas68—only begged the question of how to draw a dis- 
 
 
 
 
64 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); see also 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (“The rights 
conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair 
return for their labors.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
429 (1984) (Copyright “is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inven- 
tors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of 
their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”). The utilitarian 
framework derives ultimately from the Constitution. U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The 
Congress shall have Power . . . to Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by se- 
curing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”). 
Scholars have asserted other philosophical defenses of copyright. See Wendy J. 
Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of 
Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533, 1540–78 (1993) (suggesting a Lockean justiªcation 
for copyright); Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy 
Ownership, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1245, 1296–1300 (2001) (discussing competing theories 
for copyright and concluding that “[i]n practice, courts draw upon an uneasy and some- 
times conºicting mix of different theoretical frameworks”); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the 
Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 517, 524–29 (1990) (identi- 
fying natural law origins in United States copyright law). The United States Supreme 
Court, however, has at least nominally adhered to the utilitarian or instrumentalist ap- 
proach. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546; Sony, 464 U.S. at 429. 
65 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884); cf. Feist Pubs., Inc. 
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347–48 (1991) (“even a directory that contains abso- 
lutely no protectible written expression, only facts, meets the constitutional minimum for 
copyright protection if it features an original selection or arrangement”). 
66 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 348 (“Originality remains the sine qua non of copyright; accord- 
ingly, copyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that are origi- 
nal to the author.”). 
67 See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121. 
68 See id. 
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tinction between the two.69 In the absence of any clear guidance, the 
early look-and-feel courts concluded that the fairly abstract “feel” or 
“mood” of a work could constitute protected expression.70 
A number of recent developments, however, have suggested a 
greater willingness of courts to interpret “expression” more strictly 
and thereby to swing the pendulum away from a right to evoke in 
copyright law. Perhaps stimulated by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,71 holding that ac- 
tionable copying requires “copying of constituent elements of the work 
that are original,” lower courts have used greater rigor in evaluating 
look-and-feel infringement claims.72 The Ninth Circuit, in particular, 
has modiªed the intrinsic/extrinsic approach laid out in Krofft to re- 
quire an initial showing of similarities between expressive elements of 
two works before a case can reach the jury.73 In addition, if a plaintiff 
rests a claim only on similarities in the combination of otherwise un- 
protectable features, the Ninth Circuit has required “virtual identity” 
 
 
 
 
69 See id. Hand acknowledged the difªculty, stating, “Nobody has ever been able to ªx 
that boundary, and nobody ever can.” Id. Many contemporary scholars have questioned 
the very pursuit of a dichotomy between idea and expression. See Yen, supra note 23, at 405 
(“[T]he quest for separation of idea and expression” set forth in the seminal case to make 
the distinction is “based primarily on instinct, and not upon some principled distinction 
between the two categories . . . . [T]he Nichols opinion never stated any principle which 
tells the court where to draw the line between idea and expression.”); see also Peter Pan 
Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (“Obviously, no prin- 
ciple can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the ‘idea,’ and has 
borrowed its ‘expression,’” so the distinction must “inevitably be ad hoc.”). 
70 See Roth, 429 F.2d at 1110. 
71 499 U.S. at 340. 
72 Id. at 361 (emphasis added). 
73 See Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822–23 (9th Cir. 2002) (“when ap- 
plying the extrinsic test, a court must ªlter out and disregard the non-protectible elements 
in making its substantial similarity determination”); see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Micro- 
soft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Because only those elements of a work that 
are protectable and used without the author’s permission can be compared when it comes 
to the ultimate question of illicit copying, we use analytic dissection to determine the 
scope of copyright protection before works are considered ‘as a whole.’”); Shaw v. Lind- 
heim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990) (“If a district court concludes, after analyzing 
the objective criteria under the extrinsic test, that reasonable minds might differ as to 
whether there is substantial similarity between the protected expression of ideas in two literary 
works, and the record supports the district court’s conclusion, there is a triable issue of fact 
that precludes summary judgment.”) (emphasis added). 
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in selection and arrangement.74 Other jurisdictions have similarly in- 
sisted that plaintiffs identify with particularity similarities in the origi- 
nal and allegedly infringing works, even in cases involving look-and- 
feel claims.75 
Complementing this stricter conception of “expression,” courts 
have relied upon copyright’s limiting doctrines to narrow the scope of 
look-and-feel claims. They have used merger,76 scenes-a-faire,77 and 
the originality requirement78 to ªlter out unprotected aspects of 
works in look-and-feel cases. The cumulative effect of these doctrines 
is that a plaintiff in a copyright case must persuade a court not merely 
that the defendant has done something to remind the public of the 
plaintiff’s work, but that the defendant has actually copied an 
identiªable component of the plaintiff’s original expression. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 Apple, 35 F.3d at 1446; see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 349 (describing copyright in factual 
compilations as “thin”). 
75 See Williams v. Chrichton, 84 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir. 1996). “When we determine that 
a work contains both protectible and unprotectible elements, we must take care to inquire 
only whether ‘the protectible elements, standing alone, are substantially similar.’” (quoting 
Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also Le Moine v. 
Combined Communications Corp., No. 95C5881, 1996 WL 332688, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 
13, 1996) (ªnding no infringement when, “although the two works may appear to have a 
similar total concept and feel when viewed superªcially, the similar appearance of the two 
works stems only from the [unprotected] individual elements they share, not from a sub- 
stantially similar total concept and feel arising from the creative arrangement and interac- 
tion of common elements.”); cf. Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1297–99 
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (ªnding, after detailed comparison of two architectural works, including 
particular combinations of unprotected elements, enough evidence of similarity in “look 
and feel” to survive summary judgment). 
76 The merger doctrine denies copyright protection to expression that constitutes one 
of a few ways of describing an unprotected idea. See Yankee Candle Co., Inc. v. Bridgewater 
Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2001) (applying merger doctrine to deny protection 
to candle labels and therefore to reject look-and-feel claim). 
77 See Williams, 84 F.3d at 588. 
78 E.g., Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 2d 
376, 386–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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B. Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity79 is, at core, a business right to control use 
of one’s identity in commerce.80 Although courts and commentators 
have offered various rationales for the right, most modern cases de- 
fend it on some combination of incentive, just deserts, and unjust en- 
richment grounds: celebrities should have an incentive to develop 
valuable public personas, their efforts should be rewarded, and others 
deriving ªnancial beneªts from those valuable identities should pay.81 
Publicity claims arise most often in celebrity endorsement cases, but 
the right extends to any use of a celebrity image calling attention to 
commercial interests or products.82 The publicity right originally ap- 
plied only to the use of a celebrity’s name or photograph; over time, 
however, courts extended it to the use of a celebrity’s “identity,”83 rea- 
soning that to limit the right to the use of particular features of the 
celebrity would defeat the objective of giving celebrities “a protected 
 
 
 
 
 
79 Not all states have endorsed a right of publicity, and those that have vary somewhat 
in form and substance. See McCarthy, supra note 42, §§ 1.1–.11 (discussing the develop- 
ment of right of publicity laws and noting slow and inconsistent change); see also Michael J. 
Albano, Note, Nothing to “Cheer” About: A Call for Reform of the Right of Publicity in Audiovisual 
Characters, 90 Geo. L.J. 253, 265–86 (2001) (summarizing differences among state laws). 
80 See McCarthy, supra note 42, §§ 6.3, 6.5–.6. The right emanated originally from the 
common-law right to privacy. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Pri- 
vacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 213–20 (1890). In the middle of the last century, however, courts 
decided that the general right of individuals to be left alone was not well suited to remedy- 
ing uses of celebrity identities (because the celebrities had deliberately cast themselves into 
the limelight) and accordingly developed the modern right of publicity. See Haelan Labs., 
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding that “in addi- 
tion to and independent of . . . right of privacy . . . , a man has a right in the publicity value 
of his photograph”); see also Melville Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 203, 215–23 (1954) (advocating publicity rights). 
81 See Madow, supra note 46, at 178–238 (explaining various theoretical justiªcations 
for right of publicity). 
82 See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 968 (Under Oklahoma law, the right of publicity “requires 
proof of three elements: (1) knowing use of [the celebrity’s] name[] or likeness[] (2) on 
products, merchandise, or goods (3) without [the celebrity’s] prior consent.”); McFarland 
v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1994) (“A famous individual’s name, likeness, and en- 
dorsement carry value and an unauthorized use harms the person both by diluting the 
value of the name and depriving that individual of compensation.”). 
83 See Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 624–25 (6th Cir. 2000). 
2003] An Exclusive Right to Evoke 305 
 
 
pecuniary interest in the commercial exploitation of [their] iden- 
tit[ies].”84 
Even before White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., courts found 
that use of symbols, phrases, look-alikes, or other devices to evoke the 
image of a celebrity in advertisements violated the right of publicity. 
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,85 for example, involved a 
claim by a racecar driver who objected to an advertisement that fea- 
tured a car with markings similar to his, along with an indistinct im- 
age of a driver.86 The Ninth Circuit in Motschenbacher held that, even 
though “the ‘likeness’ of plaintiff is itself unrecognizable,” a publicity 
claim could proceed because the car’s “markings were not only pecu- 
liar to the plaintiff’s cars but they caused some persons to think the 
car in question was plaintiff’s and to infer that the person driving the 
car was the plaintiff.”87 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir- 
cuit, in Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,88 found Johnny Car- 
son’s right of publicity violated by a portable-toilet company operating 
under the name “Here’s Johnny.”89 And the New York Appellate 
Court, in Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc.,90 held that a “com- 
bination of New Year’s Eve, balloons, party hats, and ‘Auld Lang Syne’ 
. . . might amount to an appropriation of [Guy Lombardo’s] carefully 
and painstakingly built personality.”91 Over time, the courts appeared 
 
 
 
84 Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) (“If 
the celebrity’s identity is commercially exploited, there has been an invasion of his right 
whether or not his ‘name or likeness’ is used.”). 
85 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974). 
86 See id. at 822. 
87 Id. at 827. 
88 698 F.2d at 831. 
89 Id. at 836. The dissent, like Judge Kozinski’s in White v. Samsung Electronics America, 
contended that First Amendment principles should limit the scope of the publicity right. 
Id. at 840 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
90 58 A.D.2d 620 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). 
91 Id. at 622; see also Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(sound-alike of Tom Waits in Frito-Lay commercial violated Waits’s right of publicity); Mid- 
ler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463–64 (9th Cir. 1988) (sound-alike commercial vio- 
lated Bette Midler’s right of publicity); Lombardo, 58 A.D.2d at 623 (Titonne, J., dissenting) 
(contending that Lombardo also stated a cause of action for invasion of privacy under New 
York law, based on use in advertising of band and conductor using “the same gestures, 
musical beat and choice of music (i.e., ‘Auld Lang Syne’) with which plaintiff had been 
associated in the public’s mind for more than a decade”). 
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to be converging on a simple rule: if a commercial actor ran an adver- 
tisement that obtained value by referencing a celebrity, that commer- 
cial actor should pay.92 
White, therefore, involved not so much a departure as a fortiªca- 
tion and detailed articulation of a trend that had begun twenty years 
before. The facts of the case are well known. Samsung, the electronics 
manufacturer, had run a series of futuristic ads intended to show how 
its products would fare over time in comparison to various pop cul- 
ture references.93 One of the ads, for Samsung VCRs, showed a robot, 
“dressed in a wig, gown, and jewelry,” standing “next to a game board 
which is instantly recognizable as the Wheel of Fortune game show 
set, in a stance for which Vanna White is famous.”94 A caption read, 
“Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D.”95 Vanna White sued, claim- 
ing that the ad violated her publicity rights.96 The district court 
granted summary judgment for Samsung, but the Ninth Circuit re- 
versed. 
The Ninth Circuit agreed that Samsung did not make use of 
White’s name or likeness, but it nonetheless held that White had al- 
leged facts sufªcient to support a publicity claim.97 True, the robot 
 
 
 
92 See Kristine M. Boylan, The Corporate Right of Publicity in Federal Dilution Legislation, 
Part II, 82 J. Pat. & Trademark Soc. 5, 27–32 (2000) (identifying sweat equity justiªca- 
tions for right of publicity law, and contending that similar arguments support a dilution 
cause of action); Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy In Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 
31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 326, 331 (1966) (“No social purpose is served by having the 
defendant get for free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for 
which he would normally pay.”). 
93 See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992). One ad 
showed a juicy steak with the caption, “Revealed to be health food, 2010 A.D.,” and an- 
other showed Morton Downey, Jr. as a presidential candidate in 2008. Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 1397. White’s claim under the federal Lanham Act was also reinstated by the 
Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1399–1400. 
97 See id. at 1397. This ªnding disposed of White’s statutory right of publicity claim, 
which required proof of knowing use of her name or likeness for advertising or selling 
purposes. See id. Citing California case law, Samsung argued that the common-law right of 
publicity contained a similar requirement, but the Ninth Circuit disagreed. Because the 
case cited by Samsung had involved use of actual photographs of the celebrity at issue, the 
court reasoned, it 
had no occasion to consider the extent beyond the use of name or likeness to 
which the right of publicity reaches. The court held only that the right of 
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did not replicate any of White’s features or use her name or voice; 
nonetheless, the court announced, “[t]he right of publicity does not 
require that appropriations of identity be accomplished through par- 
ticular means to be actionable.”98 Indeed, by limiting the right to par- 
ticular types of appropriation, “we would not only weaken the right 
but effectively eviscerate it” because “[t]he identities of the most 
popular celebrities are not only the most attractive for advertisers, but 
also the easiest to evoke without resorting to obvious means such as 
name, likeness, or voice.”99 By evoking White’s image, the court held, 
Samsung had exploited the value of White’s celebrity, and therefore it 
should pay.100 
Despite two hefty dissents101 and rancorous scholarly criticism,102 
White remains the law, at least in the Ninth Circuit. Although other 
courts have discredited or distinguished certain aspects of the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning in White,103 none has entirely abandoned the no- 
tion that a celebrity has a claim whenever an advertiser gets commer- 
cial value from evoking the celebrity’s persona. For example, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, 
Inc.,104 considered a movie actor’s claim that a toy based on his movie 
character violated his right of publicity.105 The court announced that 
the right of publicity “is now generally understood to cover anything 
 
 
 
 
 
Id. 
publicity cause of action ‘may be’ pleaded by alleging, inter alia, appropriation 
of name or likeness, not that the action may be pleaded in only those terms. 
 
98 White, 971 F.2d at 1398. 
99 Id. at 1399 (emphasis added). 
100 See id. 
101 See id. at 1402 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) ( Judge Alarcon dissented to most of the 
original opinion); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 
1993) (Kozinski, J., with O’Scannlain, J. and Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (denial of rehearing 
en banc). 
102 See Heald, supra note 10, at 804–07; Langvardt, supra note 7, at 399; Welkowitz, su- 
pra note 7, at 77–84; Stack, supra note 7, at 1194–97; Weiler, supra note 7, at 258; Peter K. 
Yu, Note, Fictional Persona Test: Copyright Preemption in Human Audiovisual Characters, 20 
Cardozo L. Rev. 355, 359–67 (1998). 
103 See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 970 (rejecting the majority’s conclusion in White that the 
First Amendment cannot insulate a celebrity parody against a right of publicity claim); 
Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 626 (6th Cir. 2000) (criticizing broadest 
interpretation of White). 
104 227 F.3d at 619. 
105 See id. at 624. 
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that suggests the plaintiff’s personal identity,”106 but held that in that 
case the actor’s identity was not suggested because the public did not 
associate him with his character.107 Had the public made such an asso- 
ciation, the plaintiff would presumably have had a publicity claim.108 
As it stands, then, the right of publicity extends to any commer- 
cial, unauthorized use of a device or symbol—including but not lim- 
ited to the individual’s name, likeness, or voice—that brings to mind a 
celebrity.109 Although theoretically the use must also commercially 
beneªt the defendant, courts generally assume that if the celebrity 
link is made, such a beneªt exists.110 The defendant need not use any 
particular attribute of the celebrity or deceive the public into thinking 
that it has.111 Evocation, alone, is enough.112 
 
 
106 Id. 
107 See id. at 626 (“we share . . . Judge Kozinski’s unwillingness to give every individual 
who appears before a television or movie camera, by occupation or happenstance, the 
right as a matter of law to compensation for every subtle nuance that may be taken by 
someone as invoking his identity without ªrst being required to prove signiªcant commer- 
cial value and identiªability”). 
108 See Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997). In Wendt, two of the actors 
in the television program Cheers sued to prevent licensed, Cheers look-alike bars from using 
barstool-sitting robots that allegedly resembled them. The district court granted summary 
judgment because the robots bore no resemblance to the actors “except that one of the 
robots, like one of the plaintiffs, is heavier than the other.” Id. at 809 (quoting district 
court). The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment for defendants, holding that a jury 
could conclude that the robots constituted likenesses of the actors that would justify a right 
of publicity claim. See id. at 810–11. The court also found the claims not preempted by  
copyright law. See id. at 809. 
109 See McCarthy, supra note 42, § 3.2. 
110 In White, for example, the Ninth Circuit simply assumed that Samsung was using 
White’s identity to its commercial advantage. See 971 F.2d at 1399. Paul Heald has sug- 
gested the commercial beneªt requirement as one way to distinguish White from earlier 
precedent and to support the argument that it represents a break from prior law: 
The invocation of Vanna was not made to convince Vanna fans to buy the 
product, but rather to convey in especially vivid fashion the abstract concept 
of durability. This use of the celebrity persona to convey a concept is 
signiªcantly different from those presented in Midler and Motschenbacher, 
where the advertisers were attempting to capitalize on the intrinsic attractive- 
ness of the unique attributes of a particular celebrity. 
Heald, supra note 10, at 807. Heald proposes, “Only ‘if the name or likeness is used [pri- 
marily] to attract attention to a work [or product]’ should liability follow.” Id. at 809 (quot- 
ing Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 cmt. c (1993) (alteration in 
original)). 
111 Cf. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463–64 (voice imitation violated right of publicity). 
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C. Trademark 
For most of its history, federal trademark law protected only 
against misleading or deceptive uses of confusingly similar marks.113 It 
was well accepted that a trademark holder had no rights against par- 
ties whose marks merely evoked the protected mark.114 Indeed, at 
least with respect to trade dress, some courts viewed it as desirable to 
allow competitors to use enough of the trade dress to evoke a compet- 
ing product, as long as the overall appearance of the product did not 
create confusion.115 
The FTDA shifted this landscape. Intended to protect “famous 
marks” against loss of their distinctiveness,116 the FTDA created a new 
cause of action that no longer depends upon the risk of customer de- 
ception. The FTDA protects famous, distinctive marks against com- 
 
 
112 See McCarthy, supra note 42, § 3.2. 
113 See S. Rep. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275 (discussing 
the purposes of the Lanham Act). “A trade-mark only gives the right to prohibit the use of 
it so far as to protect the owner’s good will against the sale of another’s product as his.” Id. 
(quoting Prestonettes v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924)). 
114 See In re Ferrero, 479 F.2d 1395, 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“The very fact that one mark 
may bring another mark to mind does not itself establish likelihood of confusion as to 
[the] source [of the product].”). 
115 See Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 656 F. Supp. 1058, 1068 (D.N.J.), 
aff’d, 834 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1987). In American Home Products, the district court held that a 
generic pharmaceutical seller did not infringe the Advil trade dress by selling pills with a 
similar brown color. See id. at 1068–69. The court pointed out that trade dress that evokes, 
but does not confuse, can serve a valuable function: 
The resemblance between two products can alert consumers to the functional 
or utilitarian equivalence between them, to the fact that one product may be 
substituted for the other in the ultimate uses for which the products are in- 
tended. The free ºow of information regarding the substitutability of prod- 
ucts is valuable to individual consumers and to society collectively, and by 
providing it a supplier engages in fair competition based on those aspects— 
for example, price—in which the products differ. 
Id. at 1068. The court further noted: “The fact that one mark may bring another mark to 
mind does not in itself establish likelihood of confusion as to source.” Id. at 1070; see also 
Conopco, Inc. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (ªnding no 
infringement when private label retailer “packages its product in a manner to make it clear 
to the consumer that the product is similar to the national brand, and is intended for the 
same purposes”). 
116 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (“The term ‘dilution’ means the lessening of the capac- 
ity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the pres- 
ence or absence of—(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other 
parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”). 
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mercial uses of other marks that “lessen[]” the famous mark’s capacity 
“to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the pres- 
ence or absence” of competition among the parties or any confusion 
as to source.117 The House report offered several examples of uses 
that could, over time, reduce a mark’s uniqueness—”the use of DU- 
PONT shoes, BUICK aspirin, and KODAK pianos would be actionable 
under this legislation.”118 
In the eight years since the FTDA’s passage, the courts of appeals 
have had differing views on everything from the degree of distinctive- 
ness  required  for  dilution  protection119 to  the  requisite  level  of 
fame120 to the question of whether the statute applies to claims be- 
 
 
117 Id. § 1125(c). 
118 H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030. 
119 The federal courts of appeals are divided as to whether inherent distinctiveness is a 
separate requirement of the FTDA. Compare TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Communica- 
tions, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2001) (“weak, non-distinctive, descriptive marks do not 
qualify for the [FTDA]’s protection, even if famous”), and Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 
191 F.3d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1999) (“It is quite clear that the statute intends distinctiveness, 
in addition to fame as an essential element.”), with Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las 
Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 166–67 (3d Cir. 2000) (“we are not persuaded that 
a mark be subject to separate tests for fame and distinctiveness”). Interestingly, Nabisco 
would have to be decided differently if the Second Circuit applied its own stated legal 
standards after the United States Supreme Court, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 
Inc. ruled  that product design cannot be inherently distinctive. 529 U.S. 205,  215–16 
(2000); see also Deere & Co. v.  MTD Prods., Inc., No. 00 CIV. 5936(LMM), 2002 WL 
1837402, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2002) (ªnding no protection under the FTDA because 
“use of color alone cannot be inherently distinctive.”) (citing Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 211; 
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162–63 (1995); TCPIP, 244 F.3d at 98)). 
See generally Toro Co. v. ToroHead, Inc., Opposition No. 114,061, 2001 WL 1734485, at *14 
(Trademark Trial & Appeal Bd. Dec. 12, 2001) (“To be vulnerable to dilution, a mark must 
be not only famous, but also so distinctive that the public would associate the term with the 
owner of the famous mark even when it encounters the term apart from the owner’s goods 
or services, i.e., devoid of its trademark context.”). 
120 Compare TCPIP, 244 F.3d at 99 (suggesting that plaintiff must show some evidence 
of public recognition—consumer surveys, press accounts, or other evidence that its adver- 
tising was effective and stating that “we think Congress envisioned that marks would qualify 
as ‘famous’ only if they carried a substantial degree of fame”), and I.P. Lund Trading ApS 
& Kroin, Inc. v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 47 (1st Cir. 1998) (“the standard for fame . . . re- 
quired to obtain anti-dilution protection is more rigorous than that required to seek in- 
fringement protection”), with Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Enter. Rent-A-Car, Inc., 238 
F.3d 378, 380 (5th Cir. 2001) (party need not show that fame extends beyond its market 
when both parties are operating in same market). I.P. Lund involved product design, and it 
quoted a provision in the Restatement that suggests an exacting standard for fame in prod- 
uct design context: “A mark that evokes an association with a speciªc source only when 
used in connection with the particular goods or services that it identiªes is ordinarily not 
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tween competitors.121 The courts of appeals have not yet resolved 
whether the statute protects trade dress,122 and despite a recent 
United States Supreme Court decision, the standard for proving dilu- 
tion remains elusive.123 Any resolution of the scope of protection 
against dilution thus appears quite a ways off. 
Nonetheless, at least in some early interpretations, the FTDA ap- 
peared to give trademark holders a broad right to obtain an injunc- 
tion merely by showing that someone else’s mark brought their mark 
to mind.124 A number of appellate decisions suggested that any symbol 
that reminded the public of a trademark posed a threat to that mark’s 
distinctiveness.125 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
for example, stated that to dilute, a mark “must be of sufªcient simi- 
larity so that, in the mind of the consumer, the junior mark will conjure 
an association with the senior.”126 Although the court considered other 
 
 
sufªciently distinctive to be protected against dilution.” See I.P. Lund. 163 F.3d at 46–47 
(quoting Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 25 cmt. e (1995)). Generally, 
the courts seem to view fame in a niche market as sufªcient if both parties are operating in 
the same niche market. See Advantage Rent-A-Car, 238 F.3d at 380; Times Mirror Magazines, 
212 F.3d at 164 (“We are persuaded that a mark not famous to the general public is never- 
theless entitled to protection from dilution where both the plaintiff and defendant are 
operating in the same or related markets, so long as the plaintiff’s mark possesses a high 
degree of fame in its niche market.”); Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 
F.3d 633, 640 (7th Cir. 1999) (summarizing authorities). 
121 See, e.g., YKK Corp. v. Jungwoo Zipper Co., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1207–08 (C.D. Cal. 
2002). 
122 See Syndicate Sales, 192 F.3d at 639 (ªnding not “insubstantial” the argument that di- 
lution protection for trade dress would be unconstitutional, but refusing to consider chal- 
lenge that was not raised before the trial court); I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 45 (assuming that 
statute applies to trade dress, but suggesting that dilution will be rare in product conªgu- 
ration cases that do not also involve confusion); Armament Sys. & Procedures, Inc. v. Lan- 
sky, No. 00 C 6317, 2002 WL 726801, at *2–4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2002) (refusing to grant 
summary judgment against dilution claim based on use of trade dress consisting of “dis- 
tinctive black frame housing with ºat side colored panels, its push button activator, its blue 
LED light and its retention clip,” though noting that “it is not at all clear” that the plaintiff 
will succeed in proving fame and other elements of dilution claim). 
123 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1123–25 (2003). 
124 See V Secret Catalogue v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 475 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d, 123 S. Ct. 
1115; Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223–24. 
125 See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223. 
126 See id. at 218 (emphasis added); see also V Secret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 475 (adopting 
Second Circuit “conjure an association” standard), rev’d, 123 S. Ct. 1115; Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 467–69 (7th Cir. 2000) (ªnding “Herbozac” dilutive of 
“Prozac” based solely on Prozac’s degree of renown and the similarity between the marks, 
based on Second Circuit’s “conjure an association” standard). 
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factors in evaluating the evidence of dilution, the focus of the inquiry 
remained whether the junior use would “remind” the public of the 
senior mark.127 At the other extreme, the U.S. Court of Appeals of the 
Fourth Circuit refused to ªnd dilution unless a plaintiff showed an 
actual, consummated adverse impact on its mark’s selling power as a 
result of the junior use.128 
These two divergent interpretations of the dilution standard 
reºected radically different conceptions of Congress’s goals in enact- 
ing the FTDA. On the one hand, a standard requiring proof of actual, 
consummated injury views the dilution statute as targeting only cases 
in which loss of selling power has already occurred, and imposes a 
virtually insurmountable hurdle of proof: even holders of distinctive, 
famous marks would have to wait for evidence of loss of brand recog- 
nition before bringing an injunction against use of the same mark by 
another party.129 On the other hand, a standard of dilution based 
solely on a mark conjuring another reºects a view that a famous mark 
has a singular association in people’s minds and is entitled to protec- 
tion against any background noise that might interfere with the purity 
of that association.130 The upshot is that the owner of a famous mark 
 
 
127 See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 219. In explaining the relevance of distinctiveness and the 
channels of commerce, for example, the court explained: 
It is easy to imagine instances where because of the low level of distinctiveness 
of the senior mark, or insufªcient similarity between the two, the use of the 
junior mark in a remote area of commerce would have little tendency to re- 
mind consumers of the senior mark and thus little capacity to dilute its effectiveness, 
but where use of the same junior mark in a closely related area would bring 
about the harm the statute was designed to avoid. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Other courts imposed a more stringent similarity requirement for dilution than for 
likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d 419, 425 (6th 
Cir. 1999) (upholding requirement that marks be “the same or very similar” to support a 
dilution claim because “Jet’s theory would permit it to enjoin the use of a vast number of 
registered trademarks containing the word ‘jet’ and used in unrelated industries”). 
128 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 
170 F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 
214 F.3d 658, 670 (5th Cir. 2000) (adopting the Fourth Circuit’s actual-harm standard). 
129 See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223–24. Even the classic examples—”DuPont” shoes, “Buick” 
aspirin, and “Kodak” pianos—would require proof of actual harm before an injunction 
could enter. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 
1030. 
130 See Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redeªned for the Year 2002, 92 Trademark Rep. 585, 
613 (2002). Under this view, the use of words that evoke the mark do not destroy, but 
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would have in gross property rights, not only in the mark itself but in 
a broad penumbra of associated words.131 The loose dilution standard, 
in other words, represents a strong right to evoke. 
In contrast to these extreme interpretations of the FTDA, some 
courts of appeals adopted a more nuanced view of the FTDA’s objec- 
tives. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, for example, 
described the overall objective of dilution analysis as protecting not 
against attenuated weakening of brand value but against the loss of the 
singularity of a famous mark: “Blurring occurs when the defendant’s 
use of its mark causes the public to no longer associate the plaintiff’s 
famous mark with its goods or services; the public instead begins asso- 
ciating both the plaintiff and the defendant with the famous mark.”132 
In this view, a trademark holder—of even a famous mark—is not enti- 
tled to absolutely pure, interference-free connections; although 
trademark holders may prevent use by others that will eventually 
make their marks lose their singularity, the circle should not be drawn 
beyond users of the mark itself and others that the public views as the 
same.133 
 
 
weaken the singular mental association between a mark and its owner: “When, therefore, 
two brands are associated, there may be a ‘fan effect’: by the process of spreading activa- 
tion, discrete and (usually) consistent propositions linked to each symbol become part of a 
larger, divergent array, with adverse memory consequences for both the brand concepts 
and each of their separate links.” Id. Advocates of this position also contend that allowing 
parties to evoke others’ brands—along with their positive associations—would unjustly 
enrich evokers because blurring and tarnishment are both “examples of the exploitation 
of the memorability of a brand.” See id. at 622. Like the related right of publicity, it reºects 
a notion that trademark holders should have the right to capture—or, in this case, to en- 
join—all of the positive associations related to their intellectual property. See id. at 623–24. 
131 Cf. Lunney, supra note 45, at 372 (In the wake of recent expansions in trademark 
law, “trademarks become property not merely in the formal, legal sense of a right assigned 
to an entity reasonably well-placed to protect and vindicate the mark’s information func- 
tion, but in the more ordinary, more substantive, and ultimately more absolute sense of a 
thing belonging fully and completely to its owner.”). 
132 Times Mirror Magazines, 212 F.3d at 168; see also Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, 
Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117, 134 (D. Mass. 1999) (“The basic idea of blurring is that the de- 
fendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark causes the public no longer to think only of plaintiff’s 
product upon seeing the famous mark, but rather to associate both the plaintiff and the 
defendant with the mark.”); 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and 
Unfair Competition § 24:68 (4th ed. 2002). 
133 See McCarthy, supra note 132, § 24:90.2. In Professor McCarthy’s view, for dilution 
to apply, the marks have to be effectively the same—”the marks must be similar enough 
that a signiªcant segment of the target group sees the two marks as essentially the same.” 
Id. He describes blurring not as an abstract loss of purity in association between mark and 
product, but as one mark seen by customers as now identifying two sources. See id. In an 
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The United States Supreme Court, in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 
Inc., adopted a version of this intermediate view of the FTDA. Al- 
though the Court agreed doctrinally with the Fourth Circuit that the 
FTDA requires “actual” rather than “likelihood of” dilution, for prac- 
tical purposes the decision forged a middle ground between the two 
standards.134 In Moseley, the owners of the “Victoria’s Secret” mark 
sued a party that adopted “Victor’s Little Secret” as the name of an 
adult gift store in Kentucky. The plaintiffs claimed that defendants’ 
use of “Victor’s Little Secret” both blurred and tarnished the “Victo- 
ria’s Secret” mark.135 The Sixth Circuit had ruled in favor of the plain- 
tiffs, ªnding that consumers hearing the name of the gift store were 
“likely automatically to think of the more famous store and to link” 
the two.136 Finding such linking “a classic instance of dilution by tar- 
nishing (associating the Victoria’s Secret name with sex toys and lewd 
coffee mugs) and by blurring (linking the chain with a single, unau- 
thorized establishment),” the Sixth Circuit upheld summary judg- 
ment for the plaintiffs.137 In reaching this conclusion, the court re- 
jected the Fourth Circuit’s requirement that plaintiffs prove 
consummated loss of selling power to prevail in an FTDA claim.138 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split 
over the “actual harm” standard.139 Noting that the FTDA applies to 
uses that “‘cause[] dilution of the distinctive quality’ of the famous 
mark,” the Court held that the statute “unambiguously requires a 
showing of actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution.”140 A 
plaintiff, in other words, must show that a defendant’s use in fact di- 
 
 
attempt to reºect this view, the district court in Hasbro required a trademark holder to 
prove “that consumers associate the two different products with the mark even if they are 
not confused as to the different origins of these products.” 66 F. Supp. 2d at 136. The Sec- 
ond Circuit has also recently shown some interest in this approach. See Hormel Foods 
Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 506 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that dilution by 
blurring occurs when consumers “‘see the plaintiff’s mark used on a plethora of different 
goods and services . . . raising the possibility that the mark will lose its ability to serve as a 
unique identiªer of the plaintiff’s product.’” (quoting Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 43)). 
134 See 123 S. Ct. at 1124. 
135 Id. at 1119. 
136 V Secret Catalogue, 259 F.3d 464, 477 (2001), rev’d, 123 S. Ct. 1115. 
137 Id. 
138 See id. at 466. 
139 Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1121–22. 
140 Id. at 1124. 
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lutes its mark, rather than merely that some future dilution is likely.141 
Although the Court offered little guidance on how one might prove 
“actual dilution,” it made clear that “the mere fact that consumers 
mentally associate the junior user’s mark with a famous mark is not 
sufªcient.”142 According to the Court, “[S]uch mental association will 
not necessarily reduce the capacity of the famous mark to identify the 
goods of its owner, the statutory requirement for dilution under the 
FTDA.”143 
While nominally adopting an actual dilution standard, however, 
the Court liberally constructed the meaning of “actual dilution.”144 
The Court not only rejected the Fourth Circuit’s requirement that 
parties prove loss of sales or proªts, it also suggested that dilution did 
not depend on survey or other evidence of the actual effect of a chal- 
lenged use in the marketplace.145 Instead, the Court indicated that 
“actual dilution can reliably be proven through circumstantial evi- 
dence—the obvious case is one where the junior and senior marks are 
identical.”146 
By suggesting that circumstantial evidence can be used to prove 
actual dilution—and by speciªcally stating that surveys proving loss of 
distinctiveness are unnecessary—the Court fell short of requiring 
proof of consummated dilution.147 In other words, if a plaintiff need 
not introduce evidence that a famous mark has suffered an actual loss 
of distinctiveness in consumers’ minds, or a loss of value associated 
with such loss of distinctiveness, then the plaintiff can prevail in a 
FTDA claim without direct proof of actual dilution.148 On the other 
hand, the plaintiff must show that the challenged use, either by its 
 
 
 
141 See id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. At the same time, the Court appeared to reject the Fourth Circuit’s strict “con- 
summated injury” standard: “Of course, [requiring actual dilution] does not mean that the 
consequences of dilution, such as an actual loss of sales or proªts, must also be proved.” Id. 
144 See Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1124. 
145 See id. (stating that the actual dilution requirement “does not mean that the conse- 
quences of dilution, such as an actual loss of sales or proªts, must also be proved,” and 
disagreeing with the Fourth Circuit’s contrary suggestion). 
146 Id. at 1125. 
147 See id. at 1124–25. 
148 See id. 
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nature or through its actual effect, causes a loss of the famous mark’s 
singularity.149 
Thus, under the Court’s suggested approach, proof of dilution 
requires either that a defendant’s use by its very nature reduces the sin- 
gularity of the famous mark (as when the defendant uses an identical 
mark) or that a defendant’s use actually reduces the singularity of the 
famous mark (by, for example, reducing its selling power, as proven 
through surveys or direct ªnancial evidence).150 The Court in Moseley 
has therefore left the FTDA intact, but deliberately rejected a strong 
right to evoke. 
 
II. The Public’s Interest in Evocation 
The above analysis explores some of the ways in which the law 
empowers people to prevent others from evoking their protected in- 
tellectual property. Assuming the case has been made, however, why 
should we care? 
A rich body of scholarship points out many of the positive rea- 
sons that speakers need an ability to evoke cultural associations to 
make effective speech. Rochelle Dreyfuss, for example, has made a 
strong case for using trademarks themselves to evoke particular im- 
ages,151 and even the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re- 
cently held that it was fair game to make fun of Barbie.152 Numerous 
scholars—and many courts—have emphasized the importance of a 
rich public domain ªlled with the tools for future authorship.153 Our 
culture would suffer if we were prevented not only from using these 
images, but from reminding people of them. 
 
 
 
 
149 See Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1124–25. 
150 See id. 
151 See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 45, at 397. 
152 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, No. 
02-633, 2003 WL 167680 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2003). 
153 See Gordon, supra note 64, at 1563–64 (1993) (contending that “creators should 
have property in their original works, only provided that such grant of property does no 
harm to other persons’ equal abilities to create or to draw upon the preexisting cultural 
matrix and scientiªc heritage”); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L.J. 965, 968 
(1990) (“The public domain should be understood not as the realm of material that is 
undeserving of protection, but as a device that permits the rest of the system to work by 
leaving the raw material of authorship available for authors to use.”). 
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There are other good reasons to avoid an abstract right to evoke, 
even if we accept existing limitations on the public’s right to use iden- 
tiªable, tangible features of existing intellectual property. First, as 
rights extend from the tangible to the ethereal, speakers will have a 
more difªcult time evaluating whether their contemplated speech 
violates someone’s rights. The resulting uncertainty will undoubtedly 
chill speech.154 Second, as the scope of rights increases beyond fea- 
tures identiªed solely with the intellectual property at issue, we run 
the  risk  of  generating  conºicting  claims  among  multiple  stake- 
holders.155 We are already experiencing a conºict of interests between 
copyright holders and actors who play roles in their copyrighted 
works.156 Those conºicts could potentially multiply if certain words, 
marks, or symbols remind the public of multiple parties. Finally, par- 
ticularly in the trademark realm, the public frequently beneªts when 
a new market entrant uses product trade dress to evoke the strong 
trade dress of an entrenched market participant.157 So long as there is 
 
 
154 See Netanel, supra note 44, at 19 (“At the very least, the idea/expression dichot- 
omy’s very vagueness induces considerable speaker self-censorship.”). 
155 See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1517 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozin- 
ski, J., dissenting) (denial of rehearing en banc). 
156 See Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1997). In Wendt, for exam- 
ple, the producers of Cheers had authorized the replica bars with all their related para- 
phernalia. See id. at 811. When the actors brought a right of publicity claim, the licensee 
defended on the ground that its license authorized use of the characters and that, because 
its right to the material sounded in copyright, it preempted the actors’ state right of pub- 
licity claim. See id. Like most courts considering such conºicts, however, the Ninth Circuit 
held the claims not preempted. See id. at 809; see also Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 
227 F.3d 619, 624–25 (6th Cir. 2000). 
157 See Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 371 (3d Cir. 1987) (“A 
response that one ‘associates’ a given product with the name of a competitive product may 
simply reºect the recognition that the two products are competitive and serve the same 
purpose.”); Fla. Breckenridge, Inc. v. Solvay, No. 97-8417-Civ-RYSKAMP, 1997 WL 695413, 
at *9 (S.D. Fla. July 18, 1997) (difference in shape of generic pill would adequately distin- 
guish it from brand-name product in a consumer’s mind, and “given the similarity in col- 
ors, she would probably know that she had been given the generic version … and not the 
wrong prescription altogether”); Hutchinson v. Essence Communications, Inc., 769 F. 
Supp. 541, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that the fact that a defendant’s use of a mark 
makes consumers “think about” plaintiff’s product “is not compelling evidence of actual 
confusion”); cf. In re Ferrero, 479 F.2d 1395, 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“The very fact of calling 
to mind may indicate that the mind is distinguishing, rather than being confused by, two 
marks.”). But see McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Granutec, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 198, 203 (E.D.N.C. 1995) 
(distinguishing American Home and ªnding likelihood of success in trademark claim by 
Tylenol, when “shape and texture as well as the color of [defendant’s] product is remarka- 
bly similar to the Tylenol gelcap”). 
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no confusion, however, the evocation serves an important public pol- 
icy goal of market competition. With dilution protection for trade 
dress, some of this desirable activity might subside.158 
In contrast with its negative effect on public discourse, an unen- 
cumbered right to evoke may not promote the core philosophical ob- 
jectives of trademark or right of publicity laws. Take the right of pub- 
licity: under a utilitarian theory, celebrities should have an incentive 
to develop personae pleasing to the public.159 As scholars have 
pointed out, however, celebrities arguably have such an incentive 
anyway, without any right of publicity.160 In any event, it is at best ques- 
tionable whether a right to proªt from evocations would add meas- 
urably to whatever incentive the right of publicity already provides. 
The other theoretical justiªcations for the right—natural rights the- 
ory and unjust enrichment—should involve some consciousness of 
whether the alleged violator has taken something of value that the 
celebrity was responsible for creating. In many (though not all) cases, 
others are primarily responsible for the value of symbols or other ref- 
erence points that happen to evoke celebrities.161 In light of these 
competing concerns, as well as the speech interests of the public out- 
lined above, courts considering publicity claims based on mere evoca- 
 
 
 
158 Theoretically, the FTDA might protect this kind of behavior as comparative adver- 
tising, but it does not ªt neatly within the comparative advertising mold. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c)(4) (2000) (allowing “[f]air use of a famous mark by another person in compara- 
tive commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of 
the owner of the famous mark”). 
159 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (right of pub- 
licity “provides an economic incentive for [performers] to make the investment required 
to produce a performance of interest to the public”). 
160 See Madow, supra note 46, at 203–04 (“Even in a world without publicity rights, ce- 
lebrities would still be able to derive substantial income from their publicity values, to say 
nothing of the income they would continue to derive from the activities to which they owe 
their fame.”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Why Should 
We Be Paying Rent?, 20 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 123, 144–45 (1996) (“[T]he right of pub- 
licity does not ªt the utilitarian mold because the cost of creating a persona are recaptured 
through the activity with which the purveyor is primarily associated . . . . Furthermore, the 
marginal increase in incentives that this right  provides  is  not  likely  to  produce  any 
signiªcant increase in the amount of creative material produced.”). 
161 See White, 989 F.2d at 1517 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (denial of rehearing en banc). 
In the context of most television programs, for example, the shows’ creators have arguably 
had more of a hand in building the value of the set and other features that might be ar- 
gued to evoke one of the characters. See id.; Dreyfuss, supra note 160, at 144–45. 
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tion should at least engage in some balancing to determine whether 
the right of publicity should prevail in a particular case.162 
Similar considerations apply to dilution. To the extent that dilu- 
tion law seeks to prevent junior users from commandeering famous 
marks such that consumers no longer can identify their source,163 that 
problem can be adequately addressed by applying dilution law only 
against marks that are identical or legally equivalent to a famous 
mark.164 The FTDA, after all, was intended to protect not only owners 
of famous trademarks, but also the public.165 Extending dilution 
rights to all marks bearing any associational relationship to famous 
ones exceeds the narrow objectives of the statute, at a signiªcant so- 
cietal cost. To be sure, such an interpretation arguably protects the 
purity of the famous mark’s recall with consumers; but the existence 
and exclusivity of the recall is not threatened. In comparison with the 
public interests outlined above, the added value of a right to evoke 
seems insigniªcant. 
 
III. Some Proposals 
Constraining the right to evoke requires neither legislative action 
nor radical judicial re-interpretation of existing law. To the contrary, 
as in the copyright context, courts could easily cabin the expansion of 
an evocation right merely by giving force to the limits inherent in 
trademark and right of publicity doctrines. The following are some 
possible vehicles to move in that direction. 
Two generalities apply to both trademark and right of publicity 
cases. First, courts should resist the temptation to equate evocation 
 
 
162 See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 969–76 
(10th Cir. 1996) (balancing of free speech interests with intellectual property rights in case 
involving appropriation of name and likeness of major league baseball players); see also 
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001), cert. denied, 534 
U.S. 1078 (2002) (suggesting that a First Amendment defense may protect against a right 
of publicity claim when defendant has introduced “signiªcant transformative elements” or 
when “the value of the work does not derive primarily from the celebrity’s fame”). 
163 H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030 (list- 
ing “DuPont” shoes, “Buick” aspirin, and “Kodak” pianos as examples of dilutive uses of 
famous marks). 
164 Cf. Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1124 (“at least where the marks are not identical, the mere fact 
that consumers mentally associate the junior’s mark with a famous mark is not sufªcient to 
establish actionable dilution”). 
165 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031. 
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with infringement, absent some rationale to do so in a particular 
case.166 Second, even if such a rationale exists in a particular case, 
courts should not accept it blindly, but should consider whether the 
public’s  interest  in  evocation  outweighs  the  intellectual  property 
holder’s concern in that case. 
My speciªc doctrinal suggestions are somewhat more guarded. 
Courts might consider, in right of publicity cases, limiting an evoca- 
tion right to cases involving likelihood of confusion as to endorse- 
ment. In other words, if a commercial actor does not use a name or 
likeness but merely evokes a celebrity’s identity, the publicity right 
should apply only if the public is likely to believe that the celebrity 
endorsed the advertisement or product at issue. 
In the dilution context, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.167 has ar- 
guably begun a move away from a right to evoke, but more remains to 
be done. For one thing, Moseley only applies to the FTDA, and many 
state dilution laws have been invoked in cases involving mere evoca- 
tion.168 Even in federal cases, however, Moseley’s lack of clarity leaves 
some open questions. For one, the meaning of “dilution” remains un- 
clear. In light of the legislative history of the FTDA, it appears that 
courts should seek to distinguish between diluting loss of singularity, 
on the one hand, and mere background noise, on the other.169 By ar- 
ticulating dilution’s objective as the preservation of singularity of fa- 
mous marks, courts would not only avoid unjustiªed intrusions into 
the public domain, but would arguably limit dilution claims to those 
that Congress appears to have contemplated in passing the FTDA.170 
One effect of this approach might be to require near identity between 
marks before allowing a dilution claim. In cases involving non- 
identical marks, Moseley appropriately suggests a need for proof of ac- 
tual, consummated dilution because of the risk of unduly restricting 
the public domain under any approach that allows a presumption of 
actual dilution.171 Even with identical marks, this approach would 
 
 
 
166 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1124–25 (2003). 
167 Id. 
168 See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., No. 94 CIV. 2322(DLC), 1995 WL 81299, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1995). 
169 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030. 
170 See id. at 4. 
171 See Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1123–24. 
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counsel in favor of a broad version of the “nominative fair use” doc- 
trine, to make clear that uses referring to the trademark holder itself do 
not reduce the singularity of the mark because they reinforce, rather 
than weaken, association between a mark and its source.172 
Beyond clarifying the objective of the dilution inquiry, courts 
should be mindful of the positive reasons for allowing parties to evoke 
others’ products or services in pro-competitive ways. They might also 
weigh the public’s interest in such evocation in certain cases or with 
respect to certain types of marks. With trade dress, for example, it 
seems likely that the positive beneªts of evocation outweigh the inter- 
est in protecting against dilution.173 For that reason, courts should not 
presume that Congress intended to extend dilution protection to 
trade dress. 
 
Conclusion 
We should be concerned about the trend toward allowing intel- 
lectual property holders to prevent others from using non-proprietary 
words, expression, or symbols to evoke their intellectual property. 
This Article identiªes the trend and suggests some of the reasons for 
concern. It establishes that a right to evoke is not a notion limited to a 
rogue opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit or to 
right of publicity law. If we wish to preserve a rich commons and avoid 
signiªcantly chilling free expression, courts should at least cabin the 
right to evoke and ensure that, when utilized, it serves the law’s nor- 
mative goals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
172 See, e.g., EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 
56, 64 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The fair use doctrine permits use of a protected mark by others to 
describe certain aspects of the user’s own goods.”); United States Shoe Corp. v. Brown 
Group, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 199–200 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (fair use doctrine protects use of 
words “in good faith for descriptive purposes pertinent to their products,” even when use 
might remind the public of a protected trademark). 
173 Trademark holders who suffered from confusing use of trade dress, of course, 
would have a traditional likelihood of confusion claim. See 15 U.S.C § 1125(a) (2000). 
